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Wills, Trusts, Guardianships, and
Fiduciary Administration
by Mary F. Radford*
This Article examines the major cases decided and legislation enacted
from June 1, 2003 through May 31, 2004. The cases and statutes
discussed cover the substantive law relating to decedents' estates, trusts,
and guardianships, and to the fiduciaries who administer these entities.
I.

CASES OF NOTE

Year's Support
Year's support is the financial protection that Georgia law offers to the2
surviving spouse and minor children of a decedent.' In recent cases
the Georgia Court of Appeals has strictly construed the statutory
requirement that the year's support award be only that "amount
sufficient to maintain the standard of living that the surviving spouse
and each minor child had prior to the death of the decedent."3 The
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* Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. Newcomb College of
Tulane University (B.A., 1974); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1981). Member,
State Bar of Georgia. Reporter, Probate Code Revision Committee, Guardianship Code
Revision Committee, and Trust Code Revision Committee of the Fiduciary Law Section of
the State Bar of Georgia. The author expresses her appreciation to Jodi D. Mount and
Allison Robin Teal for their assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. O.C.G.A. § 53-3-7 (1997). For a discussion of year's support, see MARY F. RADFORD,
REDFEARN: WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN GEORGIA §§ 10-1 to -13 (6th ed. 2000).
2. For a discussion of these cases, see Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,
and FiduciaryAdministration, 55 MERCER L. REv. 459, 459-61 (2003).
3. O.C.G-A § 53-3-7. If no objection is filed to a spouse's or minor child's petition for
year's support, the probate court must award the petitioner the amount requested in the
petition. Id. However, if an objection is filed, the probate court then makes a determination of the appropriate amount. The court must take into consideration:
(1) The support available to the individual for whom the property is to be set
apart from sources other than year's support, including but not limited to the
principal of any separate estate and the income and earning capacity of that

457

MERCER LAW REVIEW

458

[Vol. 56

court repeated this approach in two cases during the reporting period:
Allgood v. Allgood4 and Holland v. Holland.5 Both cases involved jury
awards of year's support to the decedent's surviving spouse.6 In both
cases the court examined the income and expenses of each couple in the
year before the decedent's death, the income and expenses of the spouse
7
in the year after death, and the other resources available to the spouse.
In both cases the court of appeals determined that the amount awarded
by the jury was excessive because the surviving spouse had not proved
a need for the full amount that was awarded when weighed against the
statutory standard.8
B.

Intestacy-Childrenof an Intestate Decedent

When an individual dies intestate and is survived by one or more
children, Georgia law provides that those children will be heirs of the
Georgia courts are often faced with determining
decedent's estate.9

individual;
(2) The solvency of the estate; and
(3) Such other relevant criteria as the court deems equitable and proper.
Id.
4. 263 Ga. App. 177, 587 S.E.2d 377 (2003).
5. 267 Ga. App. 251, 599 S.E.2d 242 (2004). The decedent's will was also the subject
of a caveat and an appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court. See Holland v. Holland, 277 Ga.
792, 596 S.E.2d 123 (2004), discussed infra at text accompanying notes 63-75.
6. InAllgood the jury awarded the spouse, who received only a car under her husband's
will, cash and property valued at $158,000. A14good, 263 Ga. App. at 178, 587 S.E.2d at
378. In Hollandthe jury awarded the spouse three parcels of real property located in three
counties, tools and farming equipment, personal property, four vehicles, furnishings and
appliances, and two certificates of deposit. Holland, 267 Ga. App. at 252, 599 S.E.2d at
244.
7. In Allgood the court of appeals noted that the wife had received $126,000 at her
husband's death due to survivorship rights in joint accounts. She incurred expenses of
around $60,000 the year following his death but received income of $22,019. Allgood, 263
Ga. App. at 179, 587 S.E.2d at 379. The wife claimed that during that year she "didn't go
lacking for anything.... ." Id. at 178, 587 S.E.2d at 378. Finally, on her petition for year's
support, she refused to describe the actual property that she wanted to be awarded, and
at trial she refused to quantify the amount of money she needed. Id. at 177-79, 587 S.E.2d
at 378. In Holland the court noted that while the husband was alive, the couple had
income of $46,000 and expenses of $51,000 (including an "unusual" expense of $18,000 for
a new truck). In the year after the husband's death, the surviving spouse had income of
$29,000 and expenses of $28,000. Holland, 267 Ga. App. at 255, 599 S.E.2d at 245-46.
8. Algood, 263 Ga. App. at 180, 587 S.E.2d at 379; Holland, 267 Ga. App. at 256-57,
599 S.E.2d at 246-47. Under Georgia law, "[tihe petitioner for year's support shall have
the burden of proof in showing the amount necessary for year's support." O.C.G.A. § 53-37(c) (1997).
9. O.C.G.A. § 53-2-1 (Supp. 2004). If the decedent is also survived by a spouse, the
spouse and lineal descendants share the decedent's estate. Id.
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who constitutes a "child" of a decedent for inheritance purposes.' ° The
two cases discussed in this section deal with statutes and equitable
doctrines that are sometimes invoked to establish an individual's status
as a child, and thus an heir, of a decedent.
In 2003, after a hiatus of over six years, the Georgia Supreme Court
again faced the issue of "virtual" or "equitable" adoption. The doctrine
of virtual adoption is an equitable doctrine by which a court deems an
adoption to have taken place for inheritance purposes, although the
formalities of the adoption did not occur." In the 1994 case, O'Neal v.
Wilkes, 12 the Georgia Supreme Court held that it would not recognize
a virtual adoption unless a valid contract to adopt existed between the
individuals who were authorized to contract
adoptive parent(s) and those
3
for the child's adoption.'
4 decided in 2003, was no exception.
The case of Hulsey v. Carter,'
The claimant, Tommie Jean Hulsey, was the stepdaughter of Carson.
Tommie's biological parents were divorced, and Tommie and her sister
lived with their stepfather, Carson, from the time he married their
mother until they were adults. Carson did not formally adopt the
children. They kept their biological father's last name, and Tommie
listed her biological father as her father on formal legal documents.
Tommie had some contact with her biological father before his death and
maintained contact with his extended family. When Carson died
intestate, Tommie claimed to be Carson's daughter and heir by
application of the doctrine of virtual adoption.'5
At trial the court granted summary judgment against Tommie, and
the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed.' 6 The supreme court stated that
for a virtual adoption to be recognized, a contract to adopt must have
existed between Tommie's biological parents and her stepfather. 7 The

10. Possible "children" of a decedent are the decedent's biological children (born in or
out of wedlock), children who have been formally adopted by the decedent or who are
treated by the court as having been adopted, children conceived by artificial reproduction
techniques, and posthumous children. For a discussion of the legal definition of "child,"
see RADFORD, supra note 1, at § 9-3.
11. For a general discussion of virtual adoption, see RADFORD, supra note 1, at § 9-4.
12. 263 Ga. 850, 439 S.E.2d 490 (1994).
13. Id. at 851, 439 S.E.2d at 491. The court in O'neal was so adamant about this
requirement that a virtual adoption would not be recognized even though there was no
living individual who had the actual authority to consent to the child's adoption. Justice
Leah Sears, joined by Justice Carol Hunstein, wrote a heated dissent, which called for the
abandonment of the contract requirement. I& at 853, 439 S.E.2d at 493.
14. 277 Ga. 321, 588 S.E.2d 717 (2003).
15. Id. at 321-22, 588 S.E.2d at 717.
16. Id. at 321, 588 S.E.2d at 718.
17. Id. at 322, 588 S.E.2d at 718.
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court concluded there was no evidence of such an agreement."8 Tommie
attempted to establish the existence of an adoption agreement with
evidence that her mother claimed that upon her marriage to Carson, he
became Tommie's father, and that Carson had told relatives that he
planned to adopt the two children. 9 The court stated that Tommie's
mother could have made such a contract without their father's consent
only if Tommie's father had abandoned the children or acquiesced in
their adoption.2 ° However, the court stated that neither of these
circumstances had occurred and noted that there was no evidence that
Tommie's father had acquiesced to the adoption.2 '
Virtual legitimation is another equitable doctrine by which a court
recognizes an individual as the child (and consequently an heir) of a
decedent even if the parent-child relationship has not been formally
established.22 Historically, a child born out of wedlock was the heir of
the child's mother only, unless the father formally legitimated the
child.23 The doctrine of virtual legitimation developed as the courts
encountered situations in which it was clear that a child was the
biological child of the deceased father, although the parent-child
relationship was not formally recognized.2 4 The Official Code of
Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") was eventually expanded to delineate a
number of circumstances in which a nonmarital child could inherit from
the father even if paternity was not formally established.2 5 Included

18.

Id.

19. Id.
20. Id. at 323, 588 S.E.2d at 718. See Williams v. Murray, 239 Ga. 276, 236 S.E.2d 624
(1977).
21. Hulsey, 277 Ga. at 323, 588 S.E.2d at 719. The court pointed out that Tommie
maintained contact with her biological father up until his death when she was 28 years old
and had continued contact with his family. Id.
22. For a discussion of virtual legitimation, see RADFORD, supra note 1, at § 9-4.
23. For a general discussion of virtual or equitable legitimation and the inheritance
rights of children born out of wedlock, see RADFORD, supra note 1, at §§ 9-4 to -5.
24. See, e.g., Prince v. Black, 256 Ga. 79, 344 S.E.2d 411 (1986).
25. See O.C.G.A. §§ 53-2-3 to -4 (1997). O.C.G.A. section 53-2-3 provides in part:
(2)(A) A child born out of wedlock may not inherit from or through the child's
father, the other children of the father, or any paternal kin by reason of the
paternal kinship, unless:
(i) A court of competent jurisdiction has entered an order declaring the child to be
legitimate, under the authority of Code Section 19-7-22 or such other authority as
may be provided by law;
(ii) A court of competent jurisdiction has otherwise entered a court order
establishing paternity;
(iii) The father has executed a sworn statement signed by him attesting to the
parent-child relationship;
(iv) The father has signed the birth certificate of the child; or
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among these circumstances are cases in which there is "clear and
convincing evidence that the child is the child of the father."26
In Moore v. Mack,27 the child was born before the expansion of the
O.C.G.A., and thus, the child's claim to his putative father's estate was
based on the doctrine of virtual legitimation.2" Rather than resorting

(v) There is other clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of the
father.
(B)(i) Subparagraph (A) of this paragraph notwithstanding, a child born out of
wedlock may inherit from or through the father, other children of the father, or
any paternal kin by reason of the paternal kinship if evidence of the rebuttable
presumption of paternity described in this subparagraph is filed with the court
before which proceedings on the estate are pending and the presumption is not
overcome to the satisfaction of the trier of fact by clear and convincing evidence.
(ii) There shall exist a rebuttable presumption of paternity of a child born out of
wedlock if parentage-determination genetic testing establishes at least a 97
percent probability of paternity. Parentage-determination genetic testing shall
include, but not be limited to, red cell antigen, human leucocyte antigen (HLA),
red cell enzyme, and serum protein electrophoresis tests or testing by deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) probes.
(C) If any one of the requirements of divisions (i) through (v) of subparagraph (A)
of this paragraph is fulfilled, or if the presumption of paternity set forth in
subparagraph (B) of this paragraph shall have been established and shall not have
been rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, a child born out of wedlock may
inherit in the same manner as though legitimate from and through the child's
father, the other children of his or her father, and any other paternal kin;
Id,
26. Id. § 53-2-3(2)(A)(v).
27. 266 Ga. App. 847, 598 S.E.2d 525 (2004).
28. Id. at 847, 598 S.E.2d at 525. The father in this case died intestate in 1996. His
widow filed for letters of administration and named only herself and their son as his heirs.
She was appointed, administered the estate, and was then discharged in February 1998.
Mack, who claimed to be James's son by virtual or equitable legitimation, found out in 2000
that James's estate had been administered and Ms. Coney had been discharged. Id. at
847-48, 598 S.E.2d at 527. He first fied a "Petition to Determine Heirs," and the superior
court found that he was an heir of James by application of the doctrine of "virtual or
equitable legitimation." Id. at 848, 598 S.E.2d at 527 (citing Prince v. Black, 256 Ga. App.
79, 344 S.E.2d 582 (1986)). Next, Mack filed a "Petition to Open Estate" in the probate
court. He stated that Ms. Coney had not only known of his existence but had lied to him
by telling him that she did not want her husband's estate administered while she was still
alive. Id. The probate court found that Ms. Coney's failure to name Mack on the petition
was "fraud, accident or mistake," set aside the order discharging her, and ordered the
estate reopened. Id. Ms. Coney's guardian appealed to the superior court on the ground
that Mack's Petition to Open Estate was time-barred. Id. at 849, 598 S.E.2d at 527. The
superior court granted summary judgment in Mack's favor, Id., 598 S.E.2d at 528. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded. Id. at 852, 598 S.E.2d at 530. The court treated
the petition as a motion to set aside judgment. Id. at 849, 598 S.E.2d at 528. Subsection
(f) of O.C.GA section 9-11-60 sets a three-year limitation "from entry of the judgment
complained of." O.C.GA. § 9-11-60(f) (Supp. 2004). The "judgment complained of' was the
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to the equitable doctrine, the court of appeals applied the statute that
was in effect at the time of the father's death, stating that the statute
had codified the doctrine of virtual legitimation as it had been developed
by the Georgia courts. 29
However, the court did not interpret this
statute correctly. The pertinent section of the statute provided as

follows:
A child born out of wedlock may not inherit from or through [the
child's] father or any paternal kin by reason of the paternal kinship
unless, during the lifetime of the father3° and after the conception of
the child: ...
(E) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child is the child of
the father and that the father intended for the child to share in the
father's intestate estate in the same manner in which the child would
have shared if legitimate.31
The court of appeals said that the son could not inherit from this father
because his "efforts to procure an order establishing paternity were not
made during the father's life."32 In other words the court inferred from
the statute that the son had to establish his legitimacy during his
father's life.3" This reading of the statute was erroneous because in
articulating the doctrine of virtual legitimation, the court cited a case in
which the paternity was not established during the father's life. 3' The
case cited was Prince v. Black,35 in which the child had lived with his
father and the father had treated him as his son, but no formal
adjudication of paternity occurred during the father's lifetime."

order that discharged Ms. Coney as administrator, and the son's petition did not fall within
the three-year time bar. Mack claimed that Ms. Coney's fraud had tolled the three-year
limitation period. Moore, 266 Ga. App. at 849, 598 S.E.2d at 528. The court stated that
in order to toll the statute, the fraud must involve some type of "trick or artifice" that
prevents the individual from inquiring or investigating the claim. Id. at 850, 598 S.E.2d
at 528. Here, the actions by the widow did not prevent the son from pursuing his own
claims against the estate. Id.
29. Moore, 266 Ga. App. at 851 n.11, 598 S.E.2d at 529 n.11. In this note the court said
that a portion of the statute "is the doctrine of virtual or equitable legitimation, articulated
by the Supreme Court of Georgia in Prince, supra, and subsequently codified as former
O.C.G.A. § 53-4-4(c)(1)(E)." Id. The statute that was in effect at the time the father died
was replaced in 1998 by O.C.G.A. section 53-2-2.
30. The italicized phrase does not appear in the current version of the statute. See
O.C.G.A. § 53-2-3.
31. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-4(c)(1)(E) (1997) (repealed Jan. 1, 1998).
32. Moore, 266 Ga. App. at 851, 598 S.E.2d at 529.
33. Id. at 850-51, 598 S.E.2d at 529.
34. Id.
35. 256 Ga. 79, 344 S.E.2d 411 (1986).
36. Id at 79, 344 S.E.2d at 412.
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Wills

1. Execution and Attestation. Section 53-4-20 of the O.C.G.A.37
contains the following execution and attestation requirements for wills:
(1) the will must be in writing; (2) the will must be signed by the
testator; (3) the testator must either sign the will or acknowledge his or
her signature in the presence of two or more witnesses; and (4) the
witnesses must sign the will in the testator's presence, but not necessarily in the presence of each other.3" Georgia law also provides a procedure whereby a will can be made "self-proved." 39 A self-proved will is
presumed to be validly executed and may be admitted to probate without
the testimony of the subscribing witnesses.40 To make a will selfproved, the testator and the two subscribing witnesses must sign an
affidavit that certifies that the will was properly executed and attested.4' The affidavit is signed before a notary public, who then signs the
affidavit and affixes an official seal. 42 The will may be made selfproved at the time of the original execution and attestation, or at any
time thereafter during the lifetime of the testator and the witnesses.'
In Miles v. Bryant," the execution and attestation requirements
described above were honored, at best, in the breach. The probate court
granted summary judgment in favor of Bryant, who argued that the will
was not properly attested.'
However, the Georgia Supreme Court
reversed the summary judgment order, stating that a genuine issue of
material fact existed on whether the will was properly attested.' The
will, which consisted of six typed pages, was signed by the testator after
the last paragraph. The attestation clause followed the testator's
signature and was signed by two witnesses, one of whom was Cooper, a
long-time friend of the testator. The self-proving clause was on the same
page and followed the witnesses' signatures. The clause was signed by
Cooper, by an individual other than the one who had signed as a witness
to the will, and by a notary public. Testimony at trial showed that

37. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-20 (1997).
38. Id. For a general discussion of the execution and attestation requirements of
Georgia law, see RADFORD, supra note 1, at § 5.
39. See O.C.G.A. § 53-4-24 (1997).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. This code section contains the recommended language for the affidavit.
43. Id.
44. 277 Ga. 362, 589 S.E.2d 86 (2003).
45. Id. at 362, 589 S.E.2d at 86.
46. Id.
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Cooper had visited the testator in her hospital room and saw the testator
and the notary public signing some papers. Cooper realized that the
papers were the testator's will. The testator told Cooper that she and
the notary had already signed the will, and she showed Cooper where to
sign. Cooper signed in the presence of the testator and the notary. The
notary, who often notarized wills at that hospital, recalled seeing the
testator sign the self-proving clause. The notary, however, did not
witness the other signators. Apparently, Cooper later procured the
signatures of two other people who had never even met the testator.
clause, and the other
One signature appeared after the attestation
47
appeared in the self-proving affidavit.
The supreme court, after reciting the elements of proper execution and
attestation of a will, stated that a jury must decide whether the will was
properly executed and attested.' The court determined that Georgia
law does not require the testator to sign in a particular place on the
will.4 9 The court also noted that Cooper and the notary had signed the
will in the presence of the testator and thus could be proper witnesses
to the will.'o In a stinging dissent, Justice Benham stated that "the
majority opinion in this case ignores the fraud upon the court in which
the will in this case originated and approves of the manufacture of a
valid will from a collection of invalid parts."51 Justice Benham noted
that the other two "witnesses," the one who signed the attestation clause
and the one who signed the self-proving affidavit, had never seen the
52
testator sign the will, and they had never even met the testator.
Furthermore, Cooper admitted that she procured the fraudulent
signatures.53 Justice Benham concluded:
The majority's reversal of the well-reasoned decision of the trial court
establishes a new low-water mark for appellate consideration of wills,
approving the fabrication of a will from fraud-riddled bits and pieces.
Because the decision in this case encourages deception perpetrated on
the courts and invents questions of fact where none exist, I dissent."
The majority, on the other hand, seemed less concerned about fraud
than about protecting the testator's right to make a valid will. The
majority stated that "[t]he opportunity to determine the disposition of

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 363, 589 S.E.2d at 86-87.
Id. at 365, 589 S.E.2d at 87.
Id. at 364, 589 S.E.2d at 88.
Id.
Id. at 367, 589 S.E.2d at 89 (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
Id. at 367-68, 589 S.E.2d at 90 (Benham, J., dissenting).
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one's property at death by means of a will has long been a valuable right
in this state,"5 and one way to preserve this right is to let a jury decide
whether the will had been properly executed and attested.5 6
2. Undue Influence and Confidential Relationships. Georgia
statutory law requires that a will be freely executed and not be the
product of "undue influence whereby the will of another is substituted
for the wishes of the testator."57 Georgia case law' s provides that a
presumption of undue influence may arise if the testator and the
individual, who purportedly influenced the testator, were in a confidential relationship. 9 The presumption of undue influence has been
recognized not only in cases relating to wills, but also in cases that
questioned whether another individual had exerted undue influence on
the maker of a deed or the donor of a gift.' Before 2002, however, will

55. Id. at 363, 589 S.E.2d at 87. This is the second time the Georgia Supreme Court
has refused to invalidate a will merely because the execution and attestation requirements
were not strictly followed. InHickox v. Wilson, 269 Ga. 180, 496 S.E.2d 711 (1998), the will
comprised two pages, which ended with lines for the testator's and witnesses' signatures.
A self-proving affidavit was attached (in the same type style), with signature lines for the
testator, two witnesses, and the notary. However, the witnesses had signed only once, on
page two, on the appropriate lines; the notary public had signed on page two on the line
marked "Testator"; and the testator had signed on the affidavit on the line marked
"Testator." Id. at 180, 496 S.E.2d at 712. The superior court granted summary judgement
for the caveators of the will. Id., 496 S.E.2d at 711. The supreme court, however, reversed,
finding it was clear that the testator had testamentary intent and that "it was merely by
oversight that the signature of the testator appears on the wrong page." Id. at 181, 496
S.E.2d at 712.
56. Miles, 277 Ga. at 365, 589 S.E.2d at 88.
57. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-12 (1997).
58. See Andrews v. Rentz, 266 Ga. 782, 470 S.E.2d 669 (1996); Bryan v. Norton, 245
Ga. 347, 265 S.E.2d 282 (1980).
59. A relationship
shall be deemed confidential, whether arising from nature, created by law, or
resulting from contracts, where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling
influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another or where, from a similar
relationship of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith, such as
the relationship between partners, principal and agent, etc.
O.C.G.A. § 23-2-58 (1997). O.C.G.A. section 23-2-59 also provides as follows:
Where, by the act or consent of parties or the act of a third person or of the law,
one person is placed in such relation to another that he becomes interested for him
or with him in any subject or property, he is prohibited from acquiring rights in
that subject or property, ... which are antagonistic to the person with whose
interest he has become associated.
O.C.G.A. § 23-2-59 (1997).
60. See, e.g., Trustees of Jesse Parker Williams Hosp. v. Nisbet, 191 Ga. 821, 14 S.E.2d
64 (1941); Parker v. Spurlin, 227 Ga. 183, 179 S.E.2d 251 (1971); Tingle v. Harvill, 228 Ga.
332, 185 S.E.2d 539 (1971); Myers v. Myers, 195 Ga. App. 529, 394 S.E.2d 394 (1990);
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contest cases consistently required not only that the confidential
relationship be proved, but also that the individual be shown to have
participated actively in the procurement of the will.6 1 Active procurefor the cancellation of
ment, on the other hand, was not a requirement
62
gifts.
of
invalidation
the
for
or
deeds
In 2002 the Georgia Supreme Court added new confusion to this area
in White v. Regions Bank' when it consolidated a will contest case with
an action to invalidate a deed. In deciding whether a presumption of
undue influence arose, the court applied the single-element test used in
deed cases, requiring only a confidential relationship, rather than the
double-pronged test used in will contest cases, requiring a confidential

relationship plus active procurement.64

In Holland v. Holland,65 a 2004 case, the Georgia Supreme Court had
the opportunity to clarify this confusion but failed to do so. Instead, the
court introduced a new method of evaluating undue influence and
confidential relationship will contests. The court focused on the nature
of the relationship between the parties rather than on the circumstances
under which the will was procured, even though the facts of the case
participation is
easily lent themselves to a discussion of whether active
66
required to raise the presumption of undue influence.
The caveators 67 relied upon the following facts: the propounder's

Matthis v. Hammond, 268 Ga. 158, 486 S.E.2d 356 (1970).
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-86 provides as follows:
A gift by a person who is just over the age of majority or who is particularly
susceptible to be unduly influenced by his parent, guardian, trustee, attorney, or
other person standing in a similar confidential relationship to one of such persons
shall be closely scrutinized. Upon the slightest evidence of persuasion or influence,
such gift shall be declared void at the instance of the donor or his legal representative and at any time within five years after the making of such gift.
O.C.G.A. § 44-5-96 (2004).
61. Andrews v. Rentz, 266 Ga. 782, 470 S.E.2d 669 (1996); Bryan v. Norton, 245 Ga.
347, 265 S.E.2d 282 (1980).
62. For a discussion of these competing theories, see RADFORD, supra note 1, at § 4-8.
63. 275 Ga. 38, 561 S.E.2d 806 (2002).
64. Id. at 39, 561 S.E.2d at 808.
65. 277 Ga. 792, 596 S.E.2d 123 (2004). This estate was also the subject of a year's
support controversy. See Holland v. Holland, 267 Ga. App. 251, 599 S.E.2d 242 (2004),
discussed supra at text accompanying notes 5-8.
66. Holland, 277 Ga. at 794, 596 S.E.2d at 126.
67. In Holland the testator's son, Arnold, was the propounder of his father's will. The
testator's widow and other son filed a caveat. They asserted that the will was the product
of a mistake of fact and undue influence. The jury agreed with them and the propounder
moved for JNOV. Holland, 277 Ga. at 792, 596 S.E.2d at 125. The trial court denied the
propounder's motion. Id. On appeal the supreme court reversed, holding that there was
no evidence to support the jury's finding of undue influence, fraud, or mistake of fact. Id.

20041

WILLS & TRUSTS

467

lawyer wrote the will after the propounder suggested to his father that
his existing will was "a mess" and needed to be redone;" the propounder was present in the lawyer's office during discussions with the testator;
69
the propounder admitted to having "input into getting the will made";
the new will conflicted with the testator's previous declarations as to
how his property was to be distributed; and the propounder received a
larger share than his brother or the children of a deceased brother. The
caveators asserted that the testator and the propounder were in a
relationship was sufficient to raise a
confidential relationship and that
70
presumption of undue influence.
The supreme court discussed the elements of an undue influence
charge and the effect of a confidential relationship. 7 The court noted
that the propounder clearly had the opportunity to exert influence and
that he had received a substantial benefit under the will; however, that
was not enough to establish undue influence. 72 Furthermore, the court
stated that the evidence did not show the type of confidential relationship that would give rise to a presumption of undue influence. 71 Such
a relationship must be one in which the "'primary beneficiary was
capable of exerting the power of leadership over the submissive
testator.'" 74 The court stated that the evidence showed that the
75
testator was "a strong individual who followed his own judgment."
The court also noted that there was evidence that the testator wanted
to change his will "in order to prevent one of his sons from influencing
his mother to 'fritter away' the estate."76 In upholding the will, the
court concluded that "'[t]o set aside a will and thus deprive a person of
77
the valuable right to make a will, a stringent standard must be met.'"
3. Contract to Make a Will. In Abrams v. Massell,7" the court of
appeals upheld an unmarried couple's contract to make, and keep in

at 795, 596 S.E.2d at 127.
68. Id. at 793, 596 S.E.2d at
69. Id. at 794, 596 S.E.2d at
70. Id. at 795, 596 S.E.2d at
71. Id. at 792-93, 596 S.E.2d
72. Id. at 793, 596 S.E.2d at
73. Id., 596 S.E.2d at 126.
74. Id. at 794, 596 S.E.2d at

126.
126.
126.
at 125.
125.
126.

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 795, 596 S.E.2d at 127 (quoting Kendrick-Owens v. Clanton, 271 Ga. 731,
732, 524 S.E.2d 237, 237 (1999)).
78. 262 Ga. App. 761, 586 S.E.2d 435 (2003), cert. granted (Ga. March 8, 2004) (No.
A03A1434).
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effect, wills that mutually benefitted each other.79 The contract, which
was prepared by a lawyer, was entered into after the couple had lived
together for several years. The contract described the codicils that each
party had previously executed in which each devised a significant
amount of property to the other. In the contract the parties agreed that
neither would change his or her will or codicil without the consent of the
other."s As consideration the parties recited that they would provide
each other
"a comfortable home life with shared expenses," settl[e] "any claims
either may have against each other, or their estates, by reason of their
friendship and support during life," releas[e] "any right which she or
he may have otherwise in the property of the other," and81giv[e] "[t]en
...

[d]ollars and other good and valuable consideration."

Abrams changed his will after moving out of their mutual home, and
Massell sued his estate for breach of contract.82 The executors of his
estate asserted that the contract was unenforceable because it was "in
furtherance of an immoral relationship which renders the contract void
The executors cited O.C.G.A. section 13-8-1," which
ab initio."s
provides, in part, that "[a] contract to do an immoral or illegal thing is
void."88 They also cited Rehak v. Mathis,8" a 1977 case in which the
Georgia Supreme Court refused to enforce a cohabitation agreement
because it was based on immoral consideration.87 In Abrams the
executors claimed that the consideration for the couple's contract to
make a will was a "meretricious relationship."'
In response the court of appeals determined that the Georgia statute
outlawing "fornication"" was deemed unconstitutional in 2003.90
However, the court noted that binding supreme court precedent still

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 768, 586 S.E.2d at 442.
Id. at 765, 586 S.E.2d at 440.
Id.
Id. at 766, 586 S.E.2d at 441.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-1 (1982).

85. Id.
86. 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977).

87. Id. at 543, 238 S.E.2d at 82.
88. Abrams, 262 Ga. App. at 766, 586 S.E.2d at 440.
89. O.C.G.A. § 16-6-18 (1968).
90. Abrams, 262 Ga. App. at 767, 586 S.E.2d at 441. The court cited In re J.M., 276
Ga. 88, 575 S.E.2d 441 (2003), which held O.C.G.A. § 16-6-18 unconstitutional. That

statute provides as follows: "An unmarried person commits the offense of fornication when

he voluntarily has sexual intercourse with another person and, upon conviction thereof,
shall be punished as for a misdemeanor." O.C.G.A. § 16-6-18.
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requires that contracts based upon sexual relationships between
unmarried adults be set aside. 91 Consequently, the court of appeals felt
it incumbent to determine whether the contract at issue was founded on
such immoral consideration.9 The court concluded that it was not."
The contract did not refer to the couple as husband and wife and did not
require that they share a bedroom or engage in a sexual relationship,
but rather, described them as "friends," who would offer each other a
"comfortable home" and "support."9 4 The court noted that in Crooke v.
Gilden,95 a cohabitation contract with similar terms had been upheld
by the supreme court.96
In March 2004 the Georgia Supreme Court granted the writ of
certiorari in Abrams.97 In doing so the court stated that it was "particularly concerned with Division 5 of the opinion of the Court of Appeals
and its holding that, as a matter of law, enforcement of the contract at
issue does not contravene [O.C.G.A. section] 13-8-1."98
PersonalRepresentatives
In two cases during the reporting period, the court of appeals
examined questions of an executor's conflict of interest. 99 In In re
0 0 the testator's daughter sought to have the
Estate of Moriarty,'
testator's wife disqualified from serving as executor of his estate.10°
D.

91. 262 Ga. App. at 767, 586 S.E.2d at 441. The court cited Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga.
541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977) and Liles v. Still, 176 Ga. App. 65, 335 S.E.2d 168 (1985).
92. Abrams, 262 Ga. App. at 767, 586 S.E.2d at 440.
93. Id.
94. Id., 586 S.E.2d at 441.
95. 262 Ga. 122, 414 S.E.2d 645 (1992).
96. Abrams, 262 Ga. App. at 767, 586 S.E.2d at 441 (citing Crooke v. Gilden, 262 Ga.
122, 414 S.E.2d 645 (1992)).
97. Abrams v. Massell, No. S04C0024 (Ga. Mar. 8, 2004).
98. Id. at *1.
99. See In re Estate of Moriarty, 262 Ga. App. 241, 585 S.E.2d 182 (2003); Walters v.
Stewart, 263 Ga. App. 475, 585 S.E.2d 248 (2003).
100. 262 Ga. App. 241, 585 S.E.2d 182 (2003).
101. The wife submitted the will for probate in common form. The daughter filed a
caveat in which she challenged the wife's ability to serve as executor in an unbiased
manner. The wife claimed that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to disqualify her
because the will was submitted for probate in common form, and earlier cases had made
it clear that there is no caveat allowed if the will is submitted for probate in common form
because the proper method of caveating the will in these circumstances is to petition for
probate in solemn form. Id. at 241-42, 585 S.E.2d at 183. These cases are discussed in
Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts, Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration,55 MERCER
L. REv. 459, 461-62 (2003). The court of appeals in In re Estate of Moriarty stated that
despite being labeled a caveat, the petition was not one that challenged the validity of the
will. 262 Ga. App. at 241, 585 S.E.2d at 183. Instead, it was a petition that challenged
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The will left the testator's entire estate in a trust with the daughter as
the primary beneficiary. The daughter's concern about the wife's
impartiality in administering the estate revolved around a joint account
that had apparently been maintained by the testator and his wife. The
wife planned to claim the account under her right of survivorship.'
The probate court found, and the court of appeals agreed, that the claim
against the estate presented a conflict of interest for the would-be
executor.'l 3 The wife argued that she should not be disqualified from
serving as executor due to the "mere fact" that she and the testator had
maintained a joint account.' 4 However, the court of appeals determined that she was disqualified not "merely because she maintained a
joint account with her husband," but also "because she claim[ed]
entitlement to funds in that account, which may belong to the estate."10 5
In Walters v. Stewart,' the court of appeals examined whether an
executor, who may have received an advancement from the testator
during the testator's life, is obliged to acknowledge that advancement by
virtue of his status as a fiduciary." 7 An advancement is a transfer
made by an individual, during life, which is intended to be an advance
payment to the transferee of amounts the transferee is due to take from
the transferor's estate."° The amount of any advancement received by
a transferee is set off against the amount that the transferee receives
from the transferor's estate.0 9 In Walters the testator's will was
executed in 1972. In 1995 the testator transferred $50,000 to his son.
Friends and family members testified that the money was meant to be
an advance payment of the son's share of his father's estate."0

the wife's right to serve as executor. Id.
102. In re Estate of Moriarty, 262 Ga. App. at 242-43, 585 S.E.2d at 183-84. Typically,
the survivor of the parties named on a joint account is the owner of the account assets
"unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different intention at the time the
account is created.... ." O.C.G.A. § 7-1-813 (2004). The question of who owns the assets
in a joint bank account frequently gives rise to litigation. For a discussion of these cases,
see RADFORD, supra note 1, at § 2-7.
103. In re Estate of Moriarty, 262 Ga. App. at 242, 585 S.E.2d at 183.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 243, 585 S.E.2d at 183.
106. 263 Ga. App. 475, 588 S.E.2d 248 (2003), cert. granted.
107. Id. at 477, 588 S.E.2d at 250.
108. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-10(b) (1997). For a general discussion of advancements, see
RADFORD, supra note 1, at § 2-4.
109. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-12 (1997).
110. Walters, 263 Ga. App. at 475, 588 S.E.2d at 248.
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At the time of the transfer, former O.C.G.A. section 53-4-50...
provided that an inter vivos payment from a parent to a child would be
treated as an advancement unless it was intended to be a "donation from
affection."" 2 This section was replaced in 1998 with O.C.G.A. section
53-1-10,"3 which provides that a transfer will be treated as an advancement only "if the will provides for the deduction of the lifetime
transfer or its value or if the satisfaction or advancement is declared in
a writing signed by the transferor within 30 days of making the transfer
or acknowledged in a writing signed by the recipient at any time."'14
The father left no written acknowledgment of the advancement. The
son, who was appointed executor of his father's estate when his father
died in 2001, refused to acknowledge that the transfer was an advancement. The decedent's daughter sought a declaratory judgment that the
transfer was an advancement"15
The trial court granted summary judgment for the son after determining that the transfer was not an advancement because no writing existed
acknowledging it as such."' The court of appeals reversed the grant
of summary judgment."7 It concluded that the law allowed the son to
acknowledge the transfer as an advancement "at any time" even though
his father had not done so in the thirty days following the transfer.'
The court stated that the son "has the authority under the statute and
the sacred duty as executor to acknowledge the transfer as an advancement, if that was in fact his father's intention."" 9 Consequently, a
genuine issue of material fact existed and summary judgment was
improper.' 20
In February 2004 the Georgia Supreme Court granted the writ of
certiorari. 121 In doing so, the court stated that it was "particularly
concerned with the following issue ... : Whether the executor of an
estate who is also a beneficiary of the estate and who received funds

111. O.C.G.A. § 53-4-50 (1997) (current version at O.C.G.A. § 53-1-10 (1998)).
112. Id.
113. O.C.G.A. § 53-1-10 (1998).
114. Id. § 53-1-10(c). The court of appeals decided that the new law should apply to
this transfer. Walters, 263 Ga. App. at 475-76, 588 S.E.2d at 249-50.
115. Walters, 263 Ga. App. at 475, 588 S.E.2d at 248.
116. Id. at 476, 588 S.E.2d at 249. The trial court apparently agreed with the daughter
that the money was intended to be an advancement and said that its ruling created "an
unintended windfall" for the son. Id. at 476 n.6, 588 S.E.2d at 249 n.6.
117. Id. at 477, 588 S.E.2d at 250.
118. Id.
119. Id.

120. Id.
121.

Stewart v. Walters, No. S04G0291 (Ga. Feb. 19, 2004).
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from the testator during the testator's life is required in the exercise of
fiduciary duty to acknowledge the receipt of funds in
the executor's
" 122
writing.

E. Trusts and Trustees
In Wachovia Bank of Georgia v. Namik, 23 the court of appeals faced
a suit in which the bank, as trustee, was sued for breach of fiduciary
duty. General Ali, an Iraqi citizen, visited his son, Namik, in Atlanta,
Georgia in 1989. While there, he and his son made three trips to the
bank. On the first trip, after transferring money from a Swiss bank
account, Ali purchased a certificate of deposit ("CD") for $350,000. On
the second trip, he purchased another $350,000 CD and a $2,650,000
CD, referred to as the "Jumbo CD," which would mature in six months.
The next day, Ali conferred with a bank officer. At the meeting and
after going over its terms with the officer, Ali signed the bank's
Revocable Living Trust Agreement, but no funds were transferred to the
trust. Six months later a memorandum from the same officer indicated
that Ali wanted to fund the trust with the money from the matured
Jumbo CD."2 The memo also indicated that Ali had orally mentioned
to the officer that he wanted "no market risks," and that he would like
to have the funds invested "only in U.S. Government issues." 25
Neither of these instructions were embodied in the written trust
agreement, which authorized the trustee to "hold, manage, invest, and
reinvest said property in its discretion."' 26
When the trust was established in September 1989, another bank
officer attempted to contact Ali at the addresses he left with the bank
and through his son. The officer wished to discuss the investment of the
trust assets, but the attempts to contact Ali were unsuccessful. Over a
year later, Namik told the bank that his father had been imprisoned,
and in 1994 Namik informed the bank that his father was executed in
May 1990.'27 Before learning of General Ali's death, the bank officers
invested the trust funds in a tax-free money-market fund "to maintain
liquidity and protect the principal ....

When it was discovered

that Ali was deceased, the funds were paid over to the bank as

122. Id. at *1.
123. 265 Ga. App. 80, 593 S.E.2d 35 (2003), cert. granted. The Author of this Article
appeared as an expert witness in the trial of this case.
124. Id. at 81, 593 S.E.2d at 37.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 83, 593 S.E.2d at 38.
127. Id. at 81, 593 S.E.2d at 37.

128. Id.
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administrator of Ali's estate. The estate tax law and regulations in
effect at the time of Ali's death caused the entire value of the trust fund
to be included in his estate as U.S. situs property, and the estate paid
tax in the amount of $933,248.49. Namik and the rest of Ali's family
sued, claiming that the bank was responsible for the estate being subject
to the taxes. 1'
First, Namik argued that the bank, as part of its fiduciary duty to Ali,
should have engaged in estate planning for Ali. It should have invested
the trust funds in assets that would not have been included in his gross
estate for U.S. estate tax purposes.130 The Internal Revenue Code lists
certain types of property that are not considered to be "situated in the
United States" 1 ' when calculating the estates of non-resident aliens.
These include proceeds of life insurance policies, certain bank deposits,
and other debt obligations, including U.S. debt obligations. 32 However, as noted by the court of appeals, prior to the 1997 amendment, the
law was "obscure. .. 'not perspicuous, not clearly expressed, vague, hard
The obscure rule in effect in 1990 would have only
to understand.'"'1
excluded issues with a maturity of over 183 days from Ali's gross estate
investments in U.S. government issues."M
The bank's argument, with which the court of appeals agreed, was
that the trustee of a revocable living trust was under no obligation to
engage in estate planning for the settlor or beneficiary, or to consider the
estate tax consequences of the investments it makes. 35 The court
stated that while a trustee may invest in accordance with the terms of
the trust agreement, according to O.C.G.A. § 53-12-287,36 the trustee
is also bound to exercise the standard of care set forth in the statute. 37 This section focuses on the knowledge the trustee has, or
should have had, at the time the investments were made. 3 8 The court
said: "The test is not whether, in hindsight, a more lucrative investment
could have been made measured from the standpoint of safety, value,
income, or tax consequences." 139 Furthermore, the bank was acting as

129. Id. at 80, 593 S.E.2d at 36.
130. Id. at 81, 593 S.E.2d at 36.
131. I.R.C. § 2106 (2000).
132. I.R.C. §§ 2105 to 2106 (2000).
133. Wachovia Bank, 265 Ga. App. at 84, 593 S.E.2d at 39 (quoting
DICTIONARY 971 (5th ed. 1979)).

134. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 38-39.
135. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 39.
136. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-287 (1998).
137. Wachovia Bank, 265 Ga. App. at 82, 593 S.E.2d at 37-38.

138. Id.
139. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 38.
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trustee under a revocable living trust, and these "trusts are vehicles for
investment purposes; they are not vehicles for estate-planning purposes
and generally, as in this case, have no testamentary provisions."140
The court realized that O.C.G.A. section 53-12-287 indicates that a
trustee, in making investment decisions, "may consider [among other
things] the anticipated tax consequences of the investments," but the
statute does not mandate that a trustee look into potential estate tax
consequences."" The court stated: "No Georgia law requires a trustee
of a revocable living trust to consider estate tax consequences of
investments or to invest trust funds to minimize estate taxes." 42
Finally, the court noted that the Georgia Supreme Court has held that
there is no duty on the part of a fiduciary "to inform itself and advise
[its] beneficiaries of obscure tax laws." 14
Second, Namik claimed that the bank breached its fiduciary and
contractual duty by not following Ali's oral instructions to invest the
trust funds in U.S. government issues.'" The court of appeals noted
that even if the bank had invested in U.S. government securities, there
was still no evidence that the bank would have chosen to invest in
securities with a maturity of over 183 days.'" The court discussed the
"cardinal rule ... that the trustor-settlor's intention be followed." 46
Intent is to be found in the language of the trust agreement, and oral
evidence will be resorted to only if the agreement is ambiguous. 147 The
court determined there was no ambiguity in the investment directions
in Ali's trust agreement.'" Additionally, the court noted that Ali could
have easily inserted his own investment directives if he had desired to
do so. 149

The court held that the interoffice memorandum "should not

have been admitted to vary the terms of the Trust Agreement because
it constitutes parol evidence inadmissible under Georgia law."5 0 The
memo did not explain any ambiguities in the agreement and, instead,

140.
141.
142.
143.
(1978)).
144.
145.
146.
(1982)).
147.
148.

Id. at 83, 593 S.E.2d at 38.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. (citing Robbins v. Nat'l Bank of Georgia, 241 Ga. 538, 543, 246 S.E.2d 660, 664
Id. at 84, 593 S.E.2d at 39.
Id.
Id. (quoting Griffith v. First Nat'l Bank, 249 Ga. 143, 146, 287 S.E.2d 526, 529
Id.
Id.

149. Id.
150. Id. at 84-85, 593 S.E.2d at 39 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13-2-2 (Supp. 1994); O.C.G.A.
§ 24-6-1 (1995)).
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"would completely change the discretion provided in the Trust Agreedid not
ment."15 ' The court further held that the memorandum
2
bank.1
the
and
Ali
between
contract
a
constitute
Finally, Namik claimed that the actions of the bank gave rise to a tort
action based on its failure to follow Ali's instructions."5 ' The court of
appeals agreed with the trial court holding that the case cited by Namik
did not create a new tort action in Georgia." 4
The Georgia Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and oral
arguments were scheduled for September 2004.15 The question for the
Court of Appeals err by reversing
court was simply: "Did the 5[Georgia]
6
the trial court's judgment?"
Tortious Interference with Inheritance
The Restatement (Second) of Torts describes a cause of action against
an individual who "by fraud, duress or other tortious means intentionally prevents another from receiving from a third person an inheritance or
gift that he would otherwise have received.""5 7 In Copelan v. Copelan,1 5 decided in 2003, the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed
whether a claimant can pursue such a cause of action while the
individual from whom the claimant hopes to inherit is still alive.5 9 In

F

151. Id. at 85, 593 S.E.2d at 39.
152. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 40.
153. Id. at 86-87, 593 S.E.2d at 41. Namik cited Wachovia Bank of Georgia v.
Reynolds, 244 Ga. App. 1, 533 S.E.2d 743 (2000).
154. Wachovia Bank, 265 Ga. App. at 87, 593 S.E.2d at 41.
155. Namik v. Wachovia Bank of Georgia, No. S04G0857 (Ga. May 24, 2004).
156. Id. at "1. Namik also appealed in this case, claiming that the trial court had
awarded insufficient damages. The trial court calculated damages by (1) assuming that
the trust fund, if properly invested, should have been invested fifty percent in estate
taxable investments and fifty percent in estate tax exempt investments; (2) holding Namik
to a duty to mitigate damages once he knew of his father's death; (3) having each party pay
its own attorney fees; and (4) having the Bank disgorge half of the fees it had charged.
Namik, 265 Ga. App. at 86, 593 S.E.2d at 40. The court of appeals, after finding no
liability on the part of the Bank, found the issues raised by Namik to be moot. Id. It is
unclear whether the Georgia Supreme Court will address the damages issue.
157. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774B (1979).
158. 261 Ga. App. 726, 583 S.E.2d 562 (2003).
159. Id. at 727, 583 S.E.2d at 563-64. No Georgia appellate court has addressed
directly whether this tort is recognized in Georgia. In an old case, Mitchell v. Langley, 143
Ga. 827, 85 S.E.2d 1050 (1915), the Georgia Supreme Court alluded to the possibility that
such a cause of action is valid. The court said:
Is it possible that where a will has been made, leaving a devise, a third person can
fraudulently and maliciously cause the testator to revoke the devise, and thus
cause a loss to the devisee, without any redress on the part of the latter? ....
[W]here an intending donor, or testator, or member of a benefit society, has
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this case the Copelan siblings were in dispute over the management and
disposition of their mother's property. Thomas and John sued Uyvonna
and Willie David, asking for restoration into their mother's name of
properties that the mother deeded to Uyvonna and Willie David.
Thomas and John partially grounded their suit on the fact that they
expected all siblings to be equal heirs to their mother's estate, and that
Uyvonna and Willie David had tortiously interfered with their expectation of inheritance."8 The trial court granted summary judgment in
favor of Uyvonna and Willie David ruling that Thomas and John had no
standing and no claim for tortious interference with their expected
inheritance.16 1 The court of appeals agreed, stating that "plaintiffs
claim16 2a basis for recovery that simply does not exist under Georgia
law."
The court's theory was that an expectancy is not a property interest,
and thus, the status as "expected heirs" did not give plaintiffs standing
to bring suit for the cancellation of their mother's deeds." The court
cited Georgia case law to bolster the well-known maxim that no one can
According to the
be the heir of an individual who is still alive.'
court, as long as the mother was alive, the children were not heirs and
had no property interest in her estate.'6 It is important to note that
while a superficial reading of Copelan would indicate that the court of
appeals chose not to recognize the tortious interference cause of action
in Georgia, the actual holding does not go that far." The court simply
stated that one cannot pursue such a claim so long as the individual

actually taken steps toward perfecting the gift, or devise, or benefit, so that if let
alone the right of the donee, devisee, or beneficiary will cease to be inchoate and
become perfect, we are of the opinion that there is such a status that an action
will lie, if it is maliciously and fraudulently destroyed, and the benefit diverted to
the person so acting, thus occasioning loss to the person who would have received
it.
Id. at 835, 85 S.E.2d at 1053. In 1986 in Morgan v. Morgan, 256 Ga. 250, 347 S.E.2d 595
(1986), the supreme court did not allow two sons of a testator to pursue such a cause of
action in superior court because their caveat in the probate court of their father's will was
still in progress. Id. at 251-52, 347 S.E.2d at 596. Again, while not directly recognizing
such a cause of action, the court did say that, should the will caveat be successful, the sons
would then "have standing, as beneficiaries of the estate, to pursue such a claim on behalf
of the estate." Id. at 251, 347 S.E.2d at 596.
160. Copelan, 261 Ga. App. at 726, 583 S.E.2d at 563.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 727, 583 S.E.2d at 563.
163. Id.
164. Id., 583 S.E.2d at 563-64 (citing Frady v. Irvin, 245 Ga. 307, 264 S.E.2d 866

(1980)).
165. Id., 583 S.E.2d at 564.
166. Id.
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from whom the claimant expects to inherit is still alive.'6 7 This is a
rational conclusion because until that individual dies, no irreparable
damage has been done; no expectation has been lost."6
II.

LEGISLATION

In 2004 the Georgia General Assembly adopted a comprehensive
revision of Title 29 of the O.C.G.A.'69 Title 29 covers the guardianships of the persons and property of minors and incapacitated adults.
The new guardianship code is the culmination of a five-year study and
drafting process by the Guardianship Code Revision Committee of the
Fiduciary Law Section of the State Bar of Georgia. 7 ' The effective
date of the new guardianship code is July 1, 2005.'
The new code is a reorganization, modernization, and clarification of
the Georgia laws that relate to the guardianship of the person and
property of minors and incapacitated adults. The revision reorganizes
the current Title 29 by separating into distinct chapters the provisions
that relate to minors, to adults, and to guardianship of the person
("guardianship")
and guardianship of the property ("conservator172
ship").

The proposed revision modernizes Georgia's guardianship code by
adopting the terminology that is used in the majority of states. For
example, the revision replaces the term "guardian of the person" with
"guardian" and the term "guardian of the property" with "conservator." 1 73 The revision incorporates recent legislative amendments to
Title 29, clarifies the current law by reflecting recent decisions of the
Georgia appellate courts on guardianship issues, and updates the
chapter governing Veteran's Administration guardianships so that it
complies with the most recent version of the Uniform Veterans'
Guardianship Act. 174 The revision adopts statutes prepared by the

167. Id.

168. I&
169. 2004 Ga. Laws 460.
170. The committee was composed of lawyers from across the state who were
experienced in estate planning and guardianship matters. The Honorable W. Marion

Guess, Probate Judge of Dekalb County, served as the Probate Judges' liaison to the
committee. The Chair of the Committee was William Linkous, Jr., and the Author of this
Article served as the Reporter. Other Committee members included: Julian Friedman,
Gregory Fullerton, John Graham, Thomas Jones, Larry V. McLeod, Faryl S. Moss, Albert
Reichert, Jr., E. Lowry Reid, Ann D. Salo, John Spears, and Rees Sumerford.

171.
172.
173.
174.

2004 Ga. Laws 460.
O.C.G.A. § 29-5-3 (Supp. 2004).
Id.
UNIF. VETERANs' GuARDIANsHIP AcT, 86 U.L.A. 287 (2001).
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National College of Probate Judges to facilitate the transfer of guardianships or conservatorships from one state to another."5 And finally, the
revision makes guardianships and conservatorships more flexible and
manageable by allowing these fiduciaries to petition the court for powers
that are more expansive than those to which guardians and conservators
are restricted under the current code. 7 "

175. O.C.G.A. § 29-5-3.
176. For example, current O.C.G.A. section 29-2-13 (Supp. 2004) restricts a guardian
of the property to investing in a "legal list" of state and federal bonds and securities. In
the revised Code, new section 29-5-23 allows the conservator to petition for permission to
make other types of investments.

